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Title word cross-reference

$(1 - 1/e)$ [ST20]. α [CR17]. ϵ [Elb21]. $\exists$ [GMVY18]. $\exists\mathbf{R}$ [BM21]. k [ACC25]. λ [GPZ21].

-complete [BM21]. **-Envy-Free** [Elb21]. **-regular** [GPZ21]. **-stable** [ACC25]. **-Strongly** [CR17].

1 [CH21a, HCGM22].

2 [CH21b].

Acceptance [Mau21]. **ACM** [CM13, CM17, GÜ23]. **Ad** [CV15, NW18]. **Additive** [GJLZ20]. **Adversarial** [EKM18]. **Advertising** [CMV15, GMMV15, GMS15, NW18]. **Affine** [NS15]. **After** [CCS17]. **Agenda** [ABC+15]. **Agents** [AKM+25, CCK+16, DSE15, GK16, KR20, MXX22, SY22, YOA+13]. **Aggregation** [KKL19]. **Algorithm** [GHV23, MBJR25]. **Algorithmic** [AER+24, FN13, HMP24]. **Algorithms** [BK20, SSCD14]. **Allocation** [AV20, AIK+25, CISZ21, CEK16, CKK25, DSSX21, EKM18, GHLTC23, GHBBM22, NW18, VZ25]. **Allocations** [AKM+25, BCIZ21, KPS18]. **Alternating** [CEK16]. **Altruism** [CDKS14, HS13]. **Amazon** [BYBYST13]. **among** [MXX22]. **Analysis** [KFH15, SSO23, JP13]. **Anarchy** [AER+24, AV23, BGR14, CDKS14, CDD+14, CKST16, KS23, MBP22, PNS16, Rou15]. **Anonymity** [RS16]. **Answering** [SY22]. **Ante** [Mau21]. **Antifolk** [PRU17].

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Each [KKL19]. **Earning** [BGHM19]. **EC'12** [LBI15]. **EC'14** [CE16]. **EC'15** [FLS18]. **EC'16** [CB19]. **EC'17** [Ano20]. **EC'19** [FM20]. **EC2** [BYBYST13]. **Economic** [EG16]. **Economics** [CM13, GMMV15, GÜ23]. **Edge** [SSK22]. **Editing** [CM17]. **Editorial** [CM17, GÜ23, PS17]. **Editors** [PS17, GÜ23]. **Effective** [CKV20]. **Effectiveness** [GMS15]. **Efficiency** [AD15, GKK20, MBP22]. **Efficient** [ACV13, BCIZ21, CFGS15, CBGdK+20, JT21, MBJR25]. **Effort** [KR20]. **Election** [ADH19]. **Electric** [CEK16]. **Elicitation** [KS19]. **Eliciting** [CKRS14]. **Envy** [AKS17, CISZ21, Elb21]. **Envy-Free** [AKS17]. **Envy-freeness** [CISZ21]. **Equilibration** [MBP22]. **Equilibria** [AEED+14, BM21, BBH+17, COP18, CFGS15, DS22, FS16, GKK20, GMVY18, GR16, GMC21, KYY20, KR15, MBJR25, HM24]. **Equilibrium** [BB15, GHV23, GPS13, HP19, HP21, KFH15, OPR16, RS14]. **Equitable** [Vel18]. **Equivalence** [Mau21]. **ESP** [JP13]. **Estimates** [HH13]. **Estimating** [CDD+25]. **Evidence** [HMP24]. **Evolving** [AFM+19].

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QPTAS [Elb21]. **Quantitative** [HV16]. **Queries** [AKL19, FS16, GMC21, LGMC22]. **Query** [AM14, BB15, GR16, MBJR25]. **Query-Efficient** [MBJR25]. **Question** [SY22]. **Quota** [BCH+20]. **Quota-based** [BCH+20]. **Quotas** [BH22, FIT+15, GHBBM22].

R [GMVY18]. **R-Completeness** [GMVY18]. **Random**

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