

A Complete Bibliography of *ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)*

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Title word cross-reference

α [CR17].
-Strongly [CR17].
ACM [CM13, CM17]. Ad [CV15].
Advertising [CMV15, GMMV15, GMS15].
Affine [NS15]. After [CCS17]. Agenda
[ABC⁺15]. Agents
[CCK⁺16, DSE15, GK16, YOA⁺13].
Algorithmic [FN13]. Algorithms
[SSCD14]. Allocation [CEK16].
Alternating [CEK16]. Altruism
[CDKS14, HS13]. Amazon [BYBYST13].
Analysis [KFH15, JP13]. Anarchy
[BGR14, CDKS14, CDD⁺14, CKST16,
PNS16, Rou15]. Anonymity [RS16].
Antifolk [PRU17]. Applications [CR17].
Approach [EG16]. Approximate
[CFGS15, FS16, GR16, PT13].
Approximating [AKS17]. Arbitrage
[CMV15]. Arrow [DGV16]. Assignment
[FB17]. Atomic [HS13]. Auction
[AKLV17]. Auctioning [ADH15]. Auctions
[AMS14, ADH15, BL16, CDE⁺14, CMV15,
CKST16, CR17, CBLHS15, DFI14, DHS15,
DHW15, HIMM13, HK15, KP13, RGKK16].
Automated [OPRS13]. Averse [DSE15].
Back [CM17]. Badge [EG16]. Based
[BB17, DFJ⁺15, GMS15]. Bayesian
[CR17, GK17]. Behavior [FP16]. Best
[CDE⁺14]. Best-Response [CDE⁺14].
Beyond [PPS15]. Bidders

[DHK⁺16, HK15]. **Bimatrix** [FS16]. **Binary** [ABC⁺15, YOA⁺13]. **Boundary** [JLSW17]. **Bounded** [BGP15]. **Bounded-Distance** [BGP15]. **Bounds** [CKST16, GR16]. **Budget** [DHS15]. **Budgets** [CBLHS15].

Call [WS15]. **Capacity** [FG16]. **Case** [BGR14]. **Characteristic** [MSR⁺14]. **Checking** [HH13]. **Chief** [PS17]. **Choices** [BFK17]. **Classifiers** [DFJ⁺15]. **Co** [PS17]. **Co-Editors-in-Chief** [PS17]. **Coalitions** [FG16]. **Collective** [ABC⁺15]. **Combinatorial** [BL16, CEK16]. **Common** [CCS17]. **Communities** [ZPvdS14]. **Comparative** [HV16]. **Competition** [PST14]. **Competitive** [KP13, Sar13]. **Complexity** [AM14, BB15, GPS13, GR16, OPR16, SSCD14]. **Computation** [BBH⁺17, CFGS15, HVM16, MSR⁺14, CM13]. **Computing** [BB17, JLSW17]. **Concepts** [BB17]. **Congestion** [BGR14, CFGS15, CG16, HS13, KR15]. **Connected** [AD15]. **Connection** [ACV13]. **Consensus** [HH13, MT13]. **Constrain** [FG16]. **Constraints** [FG16]. **Contagious** [BEK⁺13]. **Contest** [GK16]. **Convergence** [AKLV17, CDE⁺14]. **Convex** [ACV13, DGV16]. **Cookie** [GMMV15]. **Correlated** [ABF⁺17, BB15, MS15]. **Cost** [RS16]. **Cost-Sharing** [RS16]. **Covering** [BKPS14, MS15]. **Creation** [AEED⁺14, BGP15]. **Cross** [HH13]. **cryptographic** [GLR13]. **Current** [CEK16].

Debreu [DGV16]. **Decision** [CKRS14, FP16]. **Decisions** [ABC⁺15]. **Deconstructing** [BYBYST13]. **Delivery** [CV15]. **Design** [BFT16, BL16, EG16, FZ15, GK16, HH13, HVM16, KNP13, MS15, PT13, RTC16, XV15]. **Deterministic** [FT14]. **Digital** [AMS14]. **Discriminant** [DFJ⁺15]. **Discriminant-Based** [DFJ⁺15]. **Display** [CMV15, GMS15]. **Distance** [BGP15].

Distributed [ASA17, JLSW17]. **Distributions** [BBDS17, CR17]. **Divisible** [ADH15]. **Division** [AD15]. **Do** [CPS16, FG16]. **Does** [HM16]. **Domains** [FZ15, NS15, NPJ13]. **Dominance** [BB17, HKV16]. **Dominance-Based** [BB17]. **Dominant** [PPS15, NPJ13]. **dominant-strategy** [NPJ13]. **Double** [AKLV17]. **Dynamic** [BDKS15]. **Dynamics** [COP13, CDE⁺14, JLSW17, YOA⁺13].

EC'12 [LBI15]. **EC'14** [CE16]. **EC2** [BYBYST13]. **Economic** [EG16]. **Economics** [CM13, GMMV15]. **Editing** [CM17]. **Editorial** [CM17, PS17]. **Editors** [PS17]. **Effectiveness** [GMS15]. **Efficiency** [AD15]. **Efficient** [ACV13, CFGS15]. **Electric** [CEK16]. **Eliciting** [CKRS14]. **Envy** [AKS17]. **Envy-Free** [AKS17]. **Equilibria** [AEED⁺14, BBH⁺17, CFGS15, FS16, GR16, KR15]. **Equilibrium** [BB15, GPS13, KFH15, OPR16, RS14]. **ESP** [JP13]. **Estimates** [HH13]. **Ex** [RS14]. **Ex-Post** [RS14]. **Examples** [BGR14]. **Exchange** [XV15]. **Exclusive** [KNP13]. **Existence** [CFGS15]. **Exploitation** [GS15]. **Exposing** [BKPS14]. **Expressive** [DHW15]. **Extensions** [PPS15]. **Externalities** [HIMM13]. **Extraction** [HH13].

Facility [FT14]. **Fair** [AD15]. **Fairness** [OPR16, PPS15]. **Farewell** [CM17]. **Fast** [AKLV17]. **Finding** [FS16]. **Finite** [BBH⁺17]. **First** [CKST16]. **First-Price** [CKST16]. **Fit** [SSCD14]. **Flooded** [FZ15]. **Formation** [BEK⁺13]. **Free** [AKS17, KNP13]. **Function** [MSR⁺14]. **Future** [CM17].

Game [AEED⁺14, EG16, FN13, HKMN16, JLSW17, JP13]. **game-theoretic** [JP13]. **Games** [BKPS14, BGR14, BGP15, BBH⁺17, COP13, CFGS15, CG16, FS16, FT14, HS13, KR15, MSR⁺14, PRU17, Rou15].

Gamification [EG16]. **Generalized** [FB17, MSR⁺14]. **Geometric** [FW17]. **Geometry** [COP13]. **Global** [BKPS14]. **Goodness** [SSCD14]. **Goodness-of-Fit** [SSCD14]. **Goods** [AMS14, ADH15, BHSZ15]. **Greedy** [BL16]. **Grid** [CEK16].

Heterogeneous [ADH15, DHS15]. **Homotopy** [GPS13]. **Howson** [GPS13].

Impact [CDKS14]. **Impartial** [BFK17]. **Imperfect** [XV15]. **Implementation** [MSR⁺14]. **Improved** [HM16]. **Improving** [GMS15]. **Incentives** [EG16, IM15]. **Incomplete** [Rou15]. **Increase** [HM16]. **Indivisibilities** [PPS15]. **Information** [BKPS14, Rou15]. **Instance** [BYBYST13]. **Interdependent** [RTC16]. **Introduction** [CI15, CE16, FN13, LBI15, MT16, CM13]. **Issue** [CI15, CE16, FN13, LBI15]. **Items** [DHS15].

Keyword [CBLHS15].

Large [AKS17, IM15, PRU17]. **Learning** [ACV13, FP16]. **Lemke** [GPS13]. **Limitations** [BL16, PPS15]. **Limited** [BDKS15]. **Limits** [DHS15]. **Linear** [DGV16]. **Liquidity** [OPRS13]. **Liquidity-Sensitive** [OPRS13]. **Local** [HMV16]. **Location** [FT14]. **Looking** [CM17].

Maker [OPRS13]. **Making** [ACV13, CKRS14, MT13]. **Market** [ACV13, OPRS13]. **Markets** [AKS17, DGV16, IM15, KNP13, Sar13]. **Match** [GMMV15]. **Matching** [ASA17, FIT⁺15, GMMV15]. **Maximization** [BHSZ15, DHK⁺16, EFG⁺14]. **Maximizers** [NS15]. **Maximum** [ASA17]. **Measures** [SSCD14]. **Mechanism** [BFT16, BL16,

DHW15, FB17, FZ15, GK17, HH13, HMV16, KNP13, MS15, PT13, RTC16].

Mechanisms [ABF⁺17, CEK16, CCK⁺16, DSE15, FT14, RS14, WS15, NPJ13]. **Mediated** [Sar13]. **Mediators** [BFT16]. **Method** [GPS13]. **Minimal** [FW17]. **Minimum** [ASA17, FIT⁺15]. **Mixed** [ASA17]. **Monetary** [HKV16]. **Money** [PT13]. **Monitoring** [XV15]. **Multimarket** [HV16]. **Multiple** [CBLHS15]. **Myopic** [CDE⁺14].

Nash [AEED⁺14, CFGS15, FS16]. **Near** [BKPS14, COP13, MS15]. **Near-Optimal** [MS15]. **Near-Optimality** [BKPS14]. **Near-Potential** [COP13]. **Network** [AEED⁺14, BGP15, BEK⁺13, HIMM13, RS16]. **Noisy** [CPS16]. **Nonequilibrium** [FP16]. **Nonexcludable** [BHSZ15].

Observations [KNP13]. **Online** [ACV13, DHK⁺16, GMMV15, KP13, ZPvdS14]. **Opinion** [YOA⁺13]. **Opponent** [GS15]. **Optimal** [GK16, HIMM13, MS15, NPJ13, RTC16, XV15]. **Optimality** [BKPS14]. **Optimization** [ACV13, DHK⁺16]. **Optimize** [CV15]. **Oral** [AKLV17]. **Our** [CM17].

Page [DHK⁺16]. **Paradox** [HV16]. **parameter** [NPJ13]. **Payment** [DFJ⁺15]. **payments** [NPJ13]. **Payoff** [FS16]. **Peer** [FW17]. **Perspective** [FW17]. **Pieces** [AD15]. **Platforms** [XV15]. **Players** [MS15]. **Polynomial** [CG16]. **Position** [CDE⁺14]. **Positive** [HIMM13]. **Post** [RS14]. **Posted** [ABF⁺17]. **Posted-Price** [ABF⁺17]. **Posting** [BBDS17]. **Potential** [COP13]. **Power** [BFK17, CEK16, FT14, FZ15]. **Practical** [OPRS13]. **Prediction** [DSE15, FW17]. **Predictions** [CKRS14]. **Preference** [SSCD14]. **Preferences** [CCS17]. **Presence** [BEK⁺13]. **Price**

[ABF⁺17, BBM13, BGR14, CDKS14, CDD⁺14, CG16, CKST16, PNS16, Rou15]. **Prices** [BBDS17]. **Pricing** [AKS17, BDKS15, BYBYST13]. **Prior** [KNP13]. **Prior-Free** [KNP13]. **Privacy** [CCK⁺16, DFI14]. **Problem** [FB17, FP16]. **Problems** [MS15]. **Profit** [HH13]. **Program** [DGV16]. **Protocols** [ZPvdS14, GLR13]. **Provision** [CCS17]. **Provision-After-Wait** [CCS17]. **Pure** [CFG15, KR15]. **Put** [ABC⁺15].

Quantitative [HV16]. **Queries** [FS16]. **Query** [AM14, BB15, GR16]. **Quotas** [FIT⁺15].

Random [AMS14, IM15]. **Ranking** [RGKK16]. **Rating** [ZPvdS14]. **Ratio** [KP13]. **Rational** [DGV16]. **rationality** [GLR13]. **Recaps** [FP16]. **Recency** [FP16]. **Recommendations** [CKRS14]. **Recommender** [DFI14]. **Records** [FP16]. **Regular** [CR17]. **Repeated** [PRU17]. **Resource** [PPS15]. **Response** [CDE⁺14]. **Restoring** [KR15]. **Results** [SSCD14]. **Reveal** [CPS16]. **Revealed** [SSCD14]. **Revenue** [AKS17, BHSZ15, EFG⁺14, HM16]. **Ring** [CDD⁺14]. **Risk** [BEK⁺13, DSE15, PNS16]. **Risk-Averse** [DSE15]. **Robust** [HV16, MS15, RTC16]. **Routing** [CDD⁺14]. **Rules** [AM14, DFJ⁺15].

Safe [GS15]. **Sampling** [AMS14, KP13]. **Scheduling** [GK17]. **Schemes** [EFG⁺14]. **Scoring** [AM14]. **Scrip** [KFH15]. **Search** [CBLHS15, RGKK16]. **Secondary** [HK15]. **Selection** [BFK17, GPS13]. **Selfish** [CDD⁺14, NS15]. **Selling** [KNP13]. **Sensitive** [OPRS13]. **Sensitivity** [PNS16]. **Sequential** [ABF⁺17, BBH⁺17, GLR13]. **Service** [XV15]. **Shaping** [CV15]. **Sharing** [RS16]. **Shopbots** [Sar13]. **Shopbots-Mediated** [Sar13]. **Sided** [IM15].

Signaling [EFG⁺14, PST14]. **Simple** [FP16, GK16]. **Simultaneous** [CKST16]. **Single** [WS15, NPJ13]. **Single-Call** [WS15]. **single-parameter** [NPJ13]. **Smart** [CEK16]. **Social** [PST14]. **Socially** [XV15]. **Socially-Optimal** [XV15]. **Solution** [BB17]. **Solutions** [GPS13]. **Some** [KNP13]. **Special** [CI15, CE16, LBI15, FN13]. **Spectrum** [HK15]. **Sponsored** [CBLHS15, RGKK16]. **Spot** [BYBYST13]. **Stability** [CG16]. **Stackelberg** [BBH⁺17]. **Statics** [HV16]. **Stochastic** [HKV16]. **Strategic** [BFT16]. **strategy** [NPJ13]. **Strategyproof** [FIT⁺15]. **Strongly** [CR17]. **Structure** [CFG15]. **Stubborn** [YOA⁺13]. **Submodular** [DHK⁺16, HK15]. **Subsidized** [DSE15]. **Supply** [BDKS15]. **Symmetric** [HK15]. **Systems** [CEK16, DFI14, KFH15].

Targeting [HM16]. **TEAC** [CM17, PS17]. **Terms** [CM17]. **Tests** [SSCD14]. **Theorem** [PRU17]. **theoretic** [JP13]. **Theory** [EG16, JLSW17, FN13]. **Tight** [CKST16]. **Tightness** [BGR14]. **Time** [ADH15, GMS15]. **Time-Based** [GMS15]. **Tractable** [MT13]. **Tradeoffs** [RGKK16]. **Traffic** [CV15]. **Transactions** [CM13]. **Transfers** [HKV16]. **Truth** [CPS16]. **Truthful** [ADH15, BL16, CEK16, CCK⁺16, FB17]. **Truthfulness** [FZ15, HKV16]. **Two** [BFK17, CDD⁺14, IM15]. **Two-Sided** [IM15].

Uncertainty [BBM13, PNS16]. **Universal** [BGR14]. **Unknown** [BBDS17]. **Utilities** [ASA17].

Valuations [ABF⁺17, NS15]. **Value** [CCK⁺16, MSR⁺14]. **Values** [RTC16]. **VCG** [GK17, RS14]. **Verification** [FZ15]. **via** [ACV13, FS16, HH13]. **Votes** [CPS16].

Wait [CCS17]. **Web** [DHW15]. **Weighted** [BGR14, CFGS15, KR15]. **Welfare** [AKS17, DHK⁺16, PST14]. **Whole** [DHK⁺16]. **Whole-Page** [DHK⁺16]. **WINE'13** [CI15]. **without** [PT13, RS16]. **Worst** [BGR14]. **Worst-Case** [BGR14].

[AD15]

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